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Robert C. Post*
We are gathered here today to pay tribute to one of the giants of
American law, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. It is now commonly
recognized that Brennan was the driving force behind many of the
most important intellectual and doctrinal innovations we have come
to associate with the Warren Court In his last years, of course,
Brennan was often in dissent, as the Court moved to the right. A
question has been raised, therefore, about the endurance of the
Brennan legacy.
Brennan has bequeathed to us an astonishingly large number of
opinions. It is true that some of the specific holdings of these opin-
ions have since been overruled, particularly in areas like the death
penalty or federal jurisdiction. Yet the substance of the Brennan leg-
acy does not reside in the particular holdings of specific opinions.
What Brennan created during his time on the Court was no less than
an overarching intellectual framework for the ascertainment of con-
stitutional rights.
To appreciate the significance of this contribution, one must un-
derstand that in the 1950s, when Brennan was appointed to the
Court, American constitutional law was inclined to test assertions of
individual rights against the countervailing values of federalism.
These values are complex and hard to specify, but in general they re-
quired courts to attach great importance to protecting decentralized
centers of community self-definition that were associated with the
States.
Brennan proposed a wholly different picture of the American
polity.2 Instead of citizens constituting themselves through local
states, he saw individuals in constant struggle with governments, local
and national. The consequences of this vision were profound. It cut
* Alexander F. and May T. Morrison Professor of Law, Boalt Hall, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; author of CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995); editor of CENSORSHIP AND
SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION (Getty Research Institute
for the History of Art and the Humanities: Issues & Debates ed. 1998).
1. See Robert C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 8
CONST. COMMENTARY 11 (1991).
2 See Robert C. Post, Justice Brennan and Federalism, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 227 (1990).
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the ground out from the traditional communitarianvalues of federal-
ism and instead made the individual the unit of constitutional analy-
sis. This methodological individualism eventually found its supreme
expression in Brennan's innovative and influential First Amendment
jurisprudence, a jurisprudence which continues to structure First
Amendment decision making to this very day. Brennan's vision also
entailed strong egalitarian commitments, for it regarded all individu-
als as equal before the state. This vision of equality is perhaps best
displayed in Brennan's enduring opinion in Baker v. Carr,3 with its
strong predicate of egalitarian individualism. Finally, Brennan's vi-
sion suggested that an important function of constitutional rights was
to safeguard a sphere of liberty within which individuals could act in
a manner that was free from state interference-a function exempli-
fied in Brennan's several "right to privacy" decisions which, miracu-
lously, have managed to survive largely undamaged.
Brennan's true legacy inheres in this framework of constitutional
decision making, a framework that remains dominant and effective,
although applied in recent years with considerably less generosity and
humanity than Brennan was accustomed to display.4 It is a frame-
work that is clearly visible in the Commencement Address which we
have gathered to discuss. 5 In that Address Brennan offered what was
for him a characteristic tribute to the law and to lawyers as agents of
social progress and amelioration. When, in the second half of his
speech, he turned to articulating the nature of the progress for which
he yearned, Brennan stressed the three complementary themes of
egalitarianism, individualism, and freedom.
He urged Loyola's graduates to find ways to assure "equal rights
and opportunities to all"6 because, he said, "[s]ociety's overriding
concern today is with providing freedom and equality of rights and
opportunities in a realistic and not merely formal sense, to all the
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
4. The one structural aspect of Brennan's legacy that has been fundamen-tally truncated does not concern the ascertainment of constitutional rights, but
rather the regulation of access to courts. Brennan believed that access to the
courts for the evaluation of constitutional claims should be facilitated, and he
authored many important opinions making this possible. See, e.g., Bivens v. Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). But much of Brennan's work in this
area has subsequently been undone.
5. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Commencement Address Delivered to
Loyola Law School Class of 1986,31 LoY. L.A. L. Rav. 725 (1998).
6. Id. at 4.
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people of this Nation."7 He inspired Loyola's graduates with the
"sacred aspects ' of the profession, which he defined as those in
which they could assume their "rightful place in the matter of service
to the individual" in the protection of her "life, liberty, rights, estate
and beneficiaries."9 And, in ringing tones, he declared that "the re-
tention and development of our freedom continues to be the supreme
problem of our times. That is why the primary mission of the profes-
sion must be to preserve individual freedom-freedom of thought
and action-to the fullest extent possible."'10
Brennan's 1986 Commencement Address was thus a full-
throated expression of the concerns that Brennan had brought so
forcefully to bear in his re-articulation of American constitutional
law. These concerns generated what is now the preeminent frame-
work of constitutional decision making. It is a framework that as-
pires indivisibly to unite freedom, individualism, and equality.
The dangers that assail this framework do not so much arise
from the holdings of particular cases, but rather from the fact that in
recent years the internal connections between freedom, individual-
ism, and equality have begun to unravel. Fissures now separate these
three values, and, as a result, internal tensions have become visible
that were not at all apparent in the years of the Warren Court.
In his last years as a Justice, Brennan became acutely aware of
these tensions. For example, in cases like Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce"' and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc.," which involved limiting freedom of speech in order to promote
equality in the arena of campaign finance, Brennan struggled hard to
transcend an increasingly manifest strain between the values of free-
dom and of equality. He faced a similar issue in his notable opinion
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,3 in which an antidiscrimination
statute was pitted against freedom of association. Brennan also came
to appreciate an important tension between the values of equality
and individualism. In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 4 he addressed in his joint opinion the question of whether
group benefits could constitutionally be used to remedy the effects of
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. Id- at 6.
11. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
12. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
13. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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past discrimination against persons, while in Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC,15 his last opinion for the Court, he queried the more funda-
mental issue of whether equality could constitutionally attach to
groups instead of only to individuals.
In the years since Brennan's departure, even the values of free-
dom and individualism have begun to fly apart. In recent controver-
sies over the regulation of hate speech and pornography, for exam-
ple, claims have been made that meaningful freedom can be
protected only through the safeguarding of group identity and repu-
tation."
These are issues that have been made visible by the very success
of the constitutional perspective that Brennan forged in the days of
the Warren Court. They have no ready solutions within that per-
spective. One can discern them lying just beneath the surface of
Brennan's Commencement Address at Loyola. If one asks, for ex-
ample, how exactly the "ugly inequities" Brennan abhorred can be
remedied in ways that square with individual rights, the tensions be-
come immediately manifest. This is well illustrated by the ugly con-
troversy about affirmative action that has swirled through this State.
These are tensions that we receive as heirs of the Brennan leg-
acy. They define the cutting frontier of our constitutional law. And
it is our deep misfortune that we must explore and civilize that fron-
tier without the guidance of a master-jurist like Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr.
15. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
16. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992);
American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
17. Brennan, supra note 5, at 4.
